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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the challenges facing developing countries when there is uncertainty about the
policy maker type. We consider a country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for
fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs, and sovereign risk, where future output depends on the type
of policymaker in place today. There are two policymakers -- type T chooses debt and international
reserves to smooth tax collection costs; type S has higher discount factor, aiming at obtaining current
resources for narrow interest groups, and preferring not to undertake costly reforms that may enhance
future output. Financial markets do not know the type of policymaker in place and try to infer its type
by looking at its financial choices. We show that various adverse shocks (lower output, higher real
interest rate, etc.) can induce a switch from an equilibrium where each policy maker chooses its
preferred policy to another where T distorts its policies in order to separate itself from S in the least
costly way. This is accomplished by type T reducing both international reserves and external debt.
Further decline in output would induce type T to lower debt, and reserves would fall at a higher rate
than otherwise expected.
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 Lula's leap; Popular, but no populist  
 
…The victory of a worker born dirt-poor in Brazil's poverty-stricken north-east was celebrated as a victory for 
poor people everywhere. Yet Lula did not turn out to be a populist like Venezuela's Hugo Chávez. Instead of 
spending recklessly, reigniting inflation and perhaps defaulting on debt as Argentina has done, Lula clamped 
down on inflation and saved extra money to pay the debt… Spurred by a devaluation in 1999 and buoyant 
demand for commodities, exports have boomed, turning a current-account deficit into surplus. Mr Palocci has 
used the inflow of dollars to pay off foreign creditors, including the IMF. Soon, Brazil will no longer have to 
worry about a falling real driving up its debt burden. The risk premium has fallen to a record low of two 
percentage points.       
Mar 2nd 2006 The Economist  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
  In the history of sovereign debt, there have been numerous episodes in which countries 
have rapidly accumulated large debts in short periods, which have led to debt servicing problems 
later on.  A case in point is the experience of many Latin American countries in the late nineteen 
seventies.  Consistent with this pattern, several models have explored the consequences of 
having governments with high discount factors trying to get as much resources as possible while 
they are in office.  If countries with governments that maximize current resources have weaker 
growth prospects –for this very reason- than those with governments that have more long-term 
objectives in mind, then financial markets will treat these different types of countries in different 
ways.   Given the widespread prevalence of short-sighted governments, prudent governments 
who take the long view may find it difficult to convince investors that they are not of the short-
sighted type. 
  The recent history of Argentina and Brazil provides an intriguing case study.  Both 
countries were challenged by similar macroeconomic maladies in the 1980s – high inflation and 
fiscal deficiencies.  Both had weak federal systems, plagued with common pool problems, where 
provincial states had the incentive to over borrow, necessitating federal government bail-outs, 
frequently through excessive monetization.  The regime changes of the early 1990s led to rapid 
disinflation in both countries. Nevertheless, they adopted sharply different exchange rate 
systems.  Argentina chose a currency board, rigidly pegging the peso to the US dollar.  In 
contrast, Brazil put greater emphasis on reducing the bargaining power of provincial states, and 
on managed flexibility of the exchange rate.  These policies, and the external shocks of the 
1990s, put them in sharply different positions during the last five years.  Argentina ended up 
defaulting on its internal and external debt and its leaders may be writing another chapter in the  
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populist annals of Latin America [LATAM].  Brazil has managed to steer away from default, a 
remarkable task considering Lula’s political background.  As the lead quotation reveals, Lula’s 
task has been complicated by the need to earn credibility during a time of reemerging populism 
in LATAM.
1               
   In this paper, we develop a model in which a government, using debt and reserves to 
smooth tax collection costs, has to be cautious about not being mistaken for one seeking to 
maximize current resources.  Our results can shed light on the new situation that, although not as 
common as over-borrowing in LATAM, has certainly occurred: the case of a rapidly declining 
debt, partially financed by recently accumulated international reserves.  Our model does not 
address the fundamental reasons why political leaders may differ in their objectives. Specifically, 
we don’t attempt to explain their effective discount rates nor their attitudes towards present 
consumption versus investment in enduring but painful reforms.  Taking these things as given, 
we identify situations that may lead to contrasting choices, akin to the ones observed recently in 
LATAM. 
  We consider a developing country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for 
fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs and sovereign risk. There are two types of policymakers, 
differing in their preferences. One, dubbed tough (T), chooses its debt and international reserves 
to smooth tax collection costs, maximizing the representative agent expected utility.  
International Reserves can extend smoothing to bad states of nature where default is likely – 
provided they are beyond the reach of creditors.  Thus, both debt and international reserves play 
a role in optimally smoothing tax collection costs.   
The second type of policymaker, soft (S), is interested in obtaining resources for special 
interest groups while it is in office and acts with a high effective discount rate. Its choice of debt 
and international reserves is thus tilted towards obtaining current resources for these groups.  We 
assume that the differential discount factors of the two policy makers have repercussions for 
future output. Since the soft policymaker has a higher discount rate, it will not undertake reforms 
or investment to the extent that the tough policymaker will.  Hence, the future expected output 
would be lower under the soft policy maker.   
                                                 
1 See Miller et. al. (2003) for an early assessment of the challenges facing the Lula’s 
administration due to market fears of an untried Left-wing candidate.  See Aizenman (2005) for an 




  When investors have full information about the policy maker type, the soft policy maker 
ends up with higher debt and lower international reserves, as in Aizenman and Marion (2004).  
The focus of our paper is on the case where market participants do not know the type of 
policymaker in place, but try to infer its type by looking at its financial choices. 
2 We identify 
conditions under which the equilibrium outcome entails two distinct policy regimes.  In the first, 
each policy maker makes the same choices they would when markets have full information, 
thereby revealing their type to financial markets. We refer to this equilibrium as the undistorted 
policy regime.   In the second policy regime, the soft policy maker has the incentive to mimic the 
tough, inducing the tough to distort its policies so as to differentiate itself in the least expensive 
way. The result is that the tough policy maker opts for lower debt and international reserves 
while the soft policy maker chooses its undistorted policy choices (i.e. the same choices it would 
make if investors knew its type).  We call this the distorted policy regime and the equilibrium 
that results is the Least Costly Separating (LCS) Equilibrium. 
  Adverse shocks, like high international risk free interest rates, or low current output  
induce the switch from the undistorted regime to the distorted regime.  Below a threshold level 
of current output, further decline in output induces lower debt instead of higher – as would be 
expected – and reserves fall at a higher rate than otherwise expected.  This adjustment may be 
viewed as a ‘test of fire’ imposed on the tough policy maker in bad times.  We also show that the 
cost of sovereign default is an important determinant of the range of the distorted policy regime.  
A low enough default penalty induces a switch from the undistorted policy regime to the 
distorted policy regime for a given level of output.  Similarly, a drop in the expected future 
output that a soft policy maker can achieve induces a shift from the undistorted to the distorted 
policy regime for certain parameter values.    
  These results imply that political uncertainty is a key variable impacting the association 





                                                 
2 See Acharya and Diwan  (1993) and Fernandez-Ruiz (2000) for models in which countries’ financial choices –
especially debt buybacks – act as signals in the context of the debt relief packages (mainly the Brady deals) offered 
to debt-ridden economies in the early nineties.  
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2. THE MODEL 
We consider an extension of Aizenman and Marion (2004). The model has three basic 
ingredients.   
 
i) There are two types of policymakers. The tough (T) – or responsible one –  chooses its debt 
and international reserves to smooth tax collection costs in a setting with volatile output, inelastic 
demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs and sovereign risk.   Debt can accomplish this 
smoothing only when the country has access to international capital markets -in good states of 
nature. International Reserves can extend smoothing to bad states of nature –provided they are 
beyond the reach of creditors.  Thus, both debt and international reserves play a role in optimally 
smoothing tax collection costs. 
The soft (S) policymaker is interested in obtaining resources for special interest groups with high 
discount rates. Its choice of debt and international reserves is thus tilted towards obtaining 
current resources. 
 
ii) We consider the particular case in which current policy choices impact future output. We can 
envision a simple setting in which this occurs.  There are reforms that require a sacrifice today in 
exchange for higher future output. Since the soft policymaker has higher discount rates, it will 
not undertake these reforms to the extent that the tough policymaker will.  Thus, future output 
will depend on the type of policymaker in place today.   
 
iii) Financial markets do not know the type of policymaker in place, but try to infer its type by 
looking at its financial choices. 
 
We consider the two-state case in which second-period output can take only two values: 
} , { 2 h l Y Y Y ∈ , with  δ − =1 l Y ,    δ + =1 h Y , and δ > 0.  The tough policymaker induces a 
distribution for the second-period output in which  h Y Y = 2  with probability ½, while the soft 
policymaker induces a distribution with Pr ( h Y Y = 2 ) = p < ½. (This can be thought of as the 
result of a choice of whether or not to exert some costly effort in the first period).  
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Although financial markets do not know the type of policymaker in place, they assign a prior 
probability of φ  to the policymaker being soft. This implies that they assign a prior probability 
of ) 2 / 1 )( 1 ( φ φ − + ≡ p p
M  to the country obtaining a high second-period output. 
 
The Credit Market 
The country can borrow internationally an amount B in period 1 at a contractual interest rate r, so 
that it owes (1 + r) B in period 2. In the second period, the country repays the amount owed,      
(1 + r) B, if this is less costly than the default penalty,  Y α . 
So, actual repayment in period 2 equals: 
} , ) 1 min{( 2 2 Y B r S α + =                                                                                                    (1) 
Since maximum repayment cannot exceed h Y α , let us restrict attention to debt values B with 
(1+r) B h Y α ≤ . 
We assume international competitive markets, so that creditors will demand an expected 
repayment equivalent to the risk-free interest rate  f r : 
B r S E f ) 1 ( ) ( 2 + = ; which can be written as: 
) 1 (
) 1 (
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This equation implicitly defines the supply of credit. Clearly, this supply depends on the 
probability that financial markets assign to the country obtaining a high second period-output, 
) Pr( 2 h Y Y = . Since  ) Pr( 2 h Y Y =  is different depending on the type of policymaker, the supply of 
credit will also be different depending on the type of policymaker that financial markets believe 
they are facing. 
Let 
t r  be the (implicitly) defined value of r satisfying (2) when  ) Pr( 2 h Y Y = =1/2.  Thus, 
t r  is the 
interest rate charged to a policymaker believed to be tough. 
Similarly, Let 
s r  be value of r satisfying (2) when  ) Pr( 2 h Y Y = = p <1/2: it is the interest rate 
charged to a policymaker believed to be soft.  
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Finally, let us define for future reference
M r  as the interest rate charged to a policymaker 
believed to be soft with the prior probabilityφ . 
M r satisfies (2) when  ) Pr( 2 h Y Y = = 
M p . 
Since 2 / 1 < <
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When debt is risky, a policymaker perceived to be tough will be charged an interest rate lower 
than that charged to a policymaker perceived to be soft,  while a policymaker whose type is 
unknown will receive an offer that is a weighted average of the two, determined by the prior:φ .  
The following figure illustrates this point. It also illustrates the fact that the maximum debt that a 
country can obtain in period 1 increases with  ) Pr( 2 h Y Y = . Thus, the soft policymaker can obtain 
fewer resources than one with unknown type who, in turn, can obtain less than the tough type. 


















rf=0; α =0.14; δ =0.2; p=0.3; φ =0.5 








Consider first a setting with complete information: each type of policymaker chooses its 
preferred policy under the assumption that financial markets know which type it is.  Government 
revenue in the first period is obtained by a combination of taxes, T, and borrowing B.  The 
revenue is financing government expenditure, G, and hoarding international reserves, R.  The 
second period government expenditure, G, and debt repayment is financed by tax revenue and 
international reserves.  Collecting taxes is associated with deadweight loss, which reduces net 
output at a rate Γ. This rate depends positively on government net expenditure/GDP ratio, 
denoted by ξ.  Under these assumptions, the representative agent’s consumption can be reduced 
to  (1 ( )) Y ξ ξ −− Γ .
3   
  We assume that financial decisions (sovereign debt and reserves) are made before fiscal 
decisions.  Hence, the creditors lending decisions take place prior to setting the tax rate and the 
actual fiscal expenditure on fiscal consumption, G.  The tough policymaker will choose debt (B) 
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where: 
                                                 
3 The deadweight loss may be viewed as tax enforcement and collection costs.  In these circumstances, a tax rate t 
paid by the representative consumer yields tax revenue net of collection costs of  ] [ Γ − t Y , where 
. 0 " , 0 ' ); ( ≥ Γ ≥ Γ Γ = Γ t  The fiscal budget constraint linking consumer’s tax rate, t, with the fiscal revenue 
needs net of tax collection and enforcement costs defines a tax Laffer curve,  ξ = Γ − ) (t t , implicitly defining the 
consumer tax rate as a function of the net fiscal revenue needs,  ) (ξ t t = .  Consequently, consumption C is a 




t r  is the interest rate charged to a policymaker believed to be tough, defined by equation (2) 
when ) Pr( 2 h Y Y = =1/2 . 
We assume that the deadweight cost of taxes, 
2 5 . 0 )) ( ( t t λ ξ = Γ , is quadratic in the tax rate. 
  Debt and reserves allow the government to smooth both consumption and tax collection 
costs.  We will for simplicity consider the case of risk-neutrality, so that the smoothing of tax 
collection costs will be the only underlying motive behind the use of debt and reserves. 
Let ) , (
t t R B be the solution to this problem. It is the full information benchmark policy for the 
tough type. In the next section, when markets are unsure about the type of the policy maker, this 
benchmark policy is chosen in what will be called the undistorted policy regime.  
  The soft policymaker is interested in maximizing a different objective function. It will 
choose B and R to maximize the present value of the resources it obtains from capital markets to 
distribute among special interest groups, using a discount rate ρ ρ >
s : 
Max ) , , (
s s r R B V =
 
]} ) 1 ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( [ {
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1
] ) ( [ 1 l f l m
s
f h m s m Y r R Y T p B r r R Y T p R B Y T α
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− + + − + + − + +
+
+ − + , 
where  
s r  is the interest rate charge to a policymaker believed to be soft ( ) Pr( 2 h Y Y = = p <1/2), 
and ) (Y Tm denotes the maximum net tax revenue attainable.
5 
Let ) , (
s s R B be the solution to this problem. It is the full information benchmark policy for the 
soft type.  The fact that  
s
f r ρ <  implies that: 
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Under complete information, the soft policymaker holds no reserves and contracts as much debt 
as possible, to obtain an utility equal to 
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We now turn our attention to the case in which the policymaker is privately informed about its 
type. Financial markets hold a prior probability of  φ  that this type is soft. The policymaker 
chooses a financial policy (B, R) and, upon observing this choice, creditors update the prior 
probability φ , and charge an interest rate according to this updated probability.  
When financial markets do not know the type of policymaker, a main concern for the tough 
policymaker is that it may be mistaken for a soft policymaker.  We now address this concern, 
which will be at the heart of our analysis. 
We first compute for future reference the utility the soft policymaker obtains when it mimics the 
tough policymaker and is treated as such by financial markets. In such a situation the soft 
policymaker will obtain utility of 
) , , (
t t t s r R B V =
]} ) 1 ( ) ( )[ 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( [ {
1
1








m Y r R Y T p B r r R Y T p R B Y T α
ρ
− + + − + + − + +
+
+ − + . 
By mimicking the financial choice of the tough policymaker, the soft policymaker obtains an 
interest rate, 
t r , lower than 
s r . This comes at the cost of distorting its otherwise optimal 
financial policy. 
 
Notice also that the tough policymaker will never want to imitate the soft policymaker: 
) , , (
s s s t r R B V  <) , , (
t t t t r R B V . This follows from the fact that:  
i) given the interest rate 
t r ,  shifting to the soft policy maker’s benchmark 
policies ) , (
s s R B decreases its welfare.  By construction,  ) , (
t t R B  is welfare maximizing for that 
interest rate,  ) , , (
t s s t r R B V  <  ) , , (
t t t t r R B V .  
ii) Given  ) , (
s s R B , an increase in the interest rate from 
t r  to 
s r cannot increase 
welfare, ) , , (
s s s t r R B V ≤ ) , , (
t s s t r R B V . 
Let TSE be the utility the soft type obtains by following benchmark policy, less the utility it 
obtains by imitating the tough type and receiving the interest rate 
t r :  
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≡ TSE ) , , (
s s s s r R B V -) , , (
t t t s r R B V . 
We have now two different scenarios. 
i)  If  TSE > 0, the soft policymaker is better-off sticking to its undistorted 
benchmark policy rather than picking the tough type’s benchmark policy. In that case, 
each policymaker will choose its benchmark policy  and financial markets will learn 
from these choices the type of policymaker they are facing. We will call this the 
undistorted policy regime.  
ii)  If TSE < 0, then the soft policymaker is better-off imitating the tough 
policymaker.  In this case, a choice of  ) , (
t t R B  would no longer convince the markets 
that a tough policymaker made such a choice. Thus, the above undistorted choice will 
no longer be a separating equilibrium. As we will show, the tough policy maker will 
then distort its choice of debt and reserves to separate itself from the soft policy 
maker. We will call this the distorted policy regime. 
Substituting ) , , (
s s s s r R B V  and   ) , , (
t t t s r R B V we have that 
 
TSE =  
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It is instructive to see how different variables affect the value of TSE and thus, which of the 
two equilibria will prevail. By differentiating TSE we find that: 
i) A reduction in the probability that the soft type obtains a high future output (a lower p) or a 
reduction in current output ( 1 Y ) will reduce TSE and induce a shift to the distorted policy regime 














 .                                                                                 (3) 
 
To gain some insight, let us first examine a reduction in p, the probability that the soft 
government obtains a high output. This reduction leaves  ) , (
t t R B  unchanged. But it affects TSE 
through two different channels: i) it reduces the utility the soft government obtains by following  
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its complete information policy  ) , (
s s R B , because it reduces the amount of resources it can 
borrow, and ii) it increases the cross-subsidization it obtains if it mimics the tough policymaker 
policy ) , (
t t R B . Both effects make it more tempting for the soft government to mimic the tough 
one.  
Let us now examine a reduction in  1 Y . It affects TSE only through its effect on  ) , (
t t R B .  By 
increasing 
t B  and reducing
t R , it increases the utility a soft government obtains from imitating a 
tough one. 
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium zone we will be in as p and  1 Y  change. In the top panel, it 
shows that either a reduction in p for a given 1 Y , or a reduction in  1 Y  for a given p, can moves us 
away from the undistorted policy regime. It also shows in its bottom panel the optimal 
undistorted policy for the tough government, which explains the effect of  1 Y . As  1 Y  decreases, 
the tough type would like to increase debt and reduces reserves. Both movements make it more 
tempting for the soft government to imitate the tough one.  
 



























(full information policy is chosen)
DISTORTED POLICY REGIME
(LCS policy is chosen)
TSE=0
 
α =0.14; δ =0.2; G=0.06; λ =0.7; ρ =0.0; 
s ρ =0.01;  f r =0.0 




ii) We now analyze changes in the risk-free interest rate ( f r ) and the penalty creditors can 
inflict (α ). These variables have two different effects on TSE: i) They influence TSE for a given 
value of  ) , (
t t R B , and ii) they have an indirect effect in TSE through its impact on  ) , (
t t R B .  We 
have that, for a range of parameters where the first (direct) effect is higher than the second 
(indirect) effect, an increase in the risk-free interest rate ( f r ) or a decrease in the penalty 
creditors can inflict (α ) increases the likelihood that the tough policymaker abandons its 












.                                                                                        (4) 
An increase in the risk-free interest rate,  f r , or a reduction in the amount of output creditors 
can recover for sure, α , both reduce the amount of resources an opportunistic government can 
get when not trying to imitate the tough policy maker. This reduces TSE. However, an increase 
in  f r  also produces a mitigating effect by decreasing 
t B  and increasing
t R . This effect is usually 
outweighed by the former effect.   
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(full information policy is chosen)
DISTORTED POLICY REGIME
(LCS policy is chosen)
TSE=0
 
α = 0.14; δ = 0.2; G = 0.06; λ = 0.7; ρ = 0.01; 
s ρ = 0.02; Y1=1 
Figure 3  
 
Figure 3 shows in the  ) , ( p rf space whether or not we will have an undistorted policy 
equilibrium. It shows in its bottom panel that an increase in  f r  induces a tough policymaker to 
reduce debt and increase reserves, actions that the soft type dislikes. This gives the soft type less 
incentive to imitate the tough type. The top panel in figure 3 shows that this (indirect) effect is 
outweighed by the reduction in the amount a soft government can get when pursuing its 
benchmark policy. Thus, for a range of values for p, we abandon the undistorted policy 
equilibrium as  f r  increases. 














Optimal full information values for the tough type
 
 
value of Bt =
value or Rt













(full information policy is chosen)
DISTORTED POLICY REGIME
(LCS policy is chosen)
TSE=0
 
δ = 0.2; G = 0.06; λ = 0.7; ρ = 0; 
s ρ = 0.01; Y1 = 1,  f r =0.0 
Figure 4 
 
Equilibrium policies when the benchmark policies are abandoned. 
 
We now search for the equilibrium behavior when the benchmark policies do not form an 
equilibrium (TSE < 0). It turns out that, under certain conditions, we will have a separating 
equilibrium in which  
i) The soft policy maker chooses its full information policy, 
) , (
s s R B = ) 0 ,
1









ii) The tough policymaker does not choose its full information benchmark policy. Instead, it 
chooses the policy  ) , (
tc tc R B that allows it to separate itself from the soft policy maker in the 
least costly way. It is the Least Costly Separating (LCS) policy.  
More formally,  ) , (
tc tc R B is the solution to the problem:  
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Max ) , , (
t t r R B V  
s.t. ) , , (
t s r R B V ≤ ) , , (
s s s s r R B V . 
We claim that, under certain conditions,  
i) The above strategies do provide an equilibrium. 
ii) It is the most reasonable equilibrium, and 
iii) There are no pooling equilibria. 
Before explaining why this is so, let us first comment that the LCS equilibrium differs from 
the full information benchmark policies only in the policy chosen by the tough type. Here the 
tough type will choose the LCS policy  ) , (
tc tc R B instead of the full information policy ) , (
t t R B .  
Under certain regularity conditions, it turns out that the tough type reduces both debt and 
reserves to separate itself from the soft type, 
t tc B B <    and 
t tc R R < .  Figure 5 illustrates this 
point by plotting the equilibrium value of debt (top panel) and reserves (bottom panel) as a 
function of  f r  both under the undistorted and the LCS policies. 
















Shifting from the Undistorted to the Distorted Policy Regime
 
 
full information B (chosen in the Undistorted Policy R.)
LCS B (chosen in the Distorted Policy Regime)





















full information R (chosen in the Undistorted Policy R.
LCS R (chosen in the Distorted Policy Regime)
 
α = 0.14; δ =0.2; G = 0.06; λ =0.7; ρ = 0.01; 





To gain some insight on why this is so, consider the problem from which the LCS policy 
) , (
tc tc R B arises:  
Max ) , , (
t t r R B V  
s.t. ) , , (
t s r R B V ≤ ) , , (
s s s s r R B V  (IC). 
This problem is equal to the problem giving rise to the complete information policy ) , (
t t R B , 
except for (IC), the incentive compatibility constraint. This constraint tells us that the tough 
policymaker has to choose a policy that the soft policymaker does not find attractive to imitate. 
Notice how debt and reserves affect this constraint: 
i) A decrease in debt relaxes the constraint for two reasons. First, since the soft policymaker 
has a high discount rate, it prefers to borrow more debt, even if this is done at interest rates that 
reflect its true probability distribution (p) over future output.  Second, the soft policymaker 
receives a cross-subsidization when it is treated as a tough policymaker. This cross-subsidization 
is higher as debt increases. 
 ii) An increase in reserves relaxes the constraint. This, again, is because the soft policymaker 
has a high discount rate, and increasing reserves translate valuable current resources to the future 
(without increasing cross-subsidization). 
 
So, reductions in debt and increases in reserves can be used to meet the (IC) constraint. One 
would expect the tough policymaker to optimally resort to both.  This is not so because of two 
facts:  
i) A debt reduction has a more powerful effect on the constraint than an increase in reserves. 
By reducing debt, a soft policymaker not only loses the chance to spend current resources (which 
also happens by increasing reserves), but also by the mis-pricing implicit in the cross-
subsidization (this effect is not present when reserves are varied). 
ii) Debt and Reserves are complements in the tough policymaker problem. So, as Debt is 
reduced, it is also less attractive to hold Reserves. This effect is powerful enough so that, in 
equilibrium (under certain regularity conditions), the tough policymaker reduces both Debt and 




We can interpret Figure 5 as showing a situation in which doubts appear about the type of 
policymaker in place. These doubts force him to prove that he is tough, moving him to the 
distorted policy curves. In this figure the parameter values selected are such that we are in the 
distorted equilibrium zone for the whole range of values considered for  f r .  But, as we have seen 
above, changes in  f r  or in other parameters can be the cause of moving from one type of 
equilibrium to another.  
Figure 6 shows this fact. There, we can see that as  f r  increases we move from the 
undistorted policy regime to the distorted regime. This implies that beyond a certain point, 
further increases in  f r  are met with a sharp decrease in debt coupled with a reduction (instead of 
an increase) in reserves.   
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Figure 7 performs a similar exercise for current output. It is constructed for parameter values 
such that the cutoff point between the two zones is precisely a value for current output  1 1 = Y : for 
1 1 < Y we will be in the distorted equilibrium zone. This implies that, as output falls below  1 1 = Y , 
debt will decrease instead of grow –as would be predicted by the benchmark curve- and reserves 
will fall at a higher rate than otherwise expected.  The intuition for this result is similar to the 
previous ones: as output falls below  1 1 = Y , the (IC) constraint becomes tighter, and the optimal 
response is to reduce both debt and reserves.  
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α = 0.14; δ = 0.2; G = 0.06; λ = 0.7; ρ = 0; 
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Figure 7 
 
Figure 8 shows a similar pattern for α , which captures how much foreign borrowers can be 
sure of being repaid. Again, as α  decrease we abandon the undistorted policy regime, which 
implies a reduction in both debt and reserves higher than predicted by the full information policy. 
 
Let us now go back to the question of whether this is really an equilibrium.  Before proving 
that this is indeed the case, let us mention first that the crucial point is to be sure that the tough  
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policymaker (weakly) prefers to avoid being perceived as the soft type even though this requires 
distorting its benchmark policy.  
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Consider the tough policymaker’s alternative of being perceived as soft:  
Max ) , , (
s t r R B V  
With  B r B r p Y p f
s
l ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + = + + − α  if  ) 1 /( f l r Y B + >α ;  f
s r r =  otherwise. 
It turns out that the optimal choice for B,
ts B , decreases as the probability of obtaining a high 
output, p, decreases, because this implies an increase in the interest rate charged for any 
) 1 /( f l r Y B + >α . Our assumption regarding the solution to this problem will be a sufficient (not 
necessary) condition for the tough policymaker to prefer not to be treated as soft.   
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We will assume that there exists p* >0 such that 
ts B (p*) = ) 1 /( f l r Y + α  (a condition satisfied 
in all the simulations performed above).  A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this to 
occur is that the tax collection marginal cost function  ) ( ' ξ Γ  is bounded. 
To see this, notice that, after replacing  ) 1 (
s r +  from the supply curve into the objective 
function, the derivative with respect to B for  ) 1 /( f l r Y B + >α  will be equal to  
)} ( ' 1 {
) 1 ( 2
) 1 (
)} ( ' 1 {













− Γ + = . 
This expression will eventually turn negative as we reduce p, provided that  ) ( ' 1 ζ Γ is bounded. 
 
Assume now that p <  ) 2 / 1 )( 1 ( φ φ − + ≡ p p
M < p*. 
When this is the case, we can show the equilibrium results previously announced: 
 
Result 1: If   p < p* then: 
It is an equilibrium for the tough type to choose  ) , (
tc tc R B  and for the soft type to choose 
) 0 ,
1
] ) 1 [(
( ) , (
f










Consider the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs: 
A policymaker is perceived as being tough if it chooses a pair  ) , ( R B  such that 
) , , (
t s r R B V ≤ ) , , (
s s s s r R B V , and is perceived as soft otherwise. 
i) The soft policymaker has no incentives to deviate to any pair  ) , ( R B with 
) , , (
t s r R B V ≤ ) , , (
s s s s r R B V  because even under the most favorable beliefs –leading to an 
interest rate 
t r - its welfare would decrease.  It will never deviate to any pair  ) , ( R B  with 
) , , (
t s r R B V > ) , , (
s s s s r R B V  either because, given the out-of-equilibrium beliefs stated above, it 
would lead to the belief that it is soft, and  ) , (
s s R B  is the optimal policy choice among the pairs 
leading to that belief. 
ii) Let us now turn our attention to the tough policymaker. It will not deviate to any pair 
) , ( R B with ) , , (
t s r R B V ≤ ) , , (
s s s s r R B V  because the equilibrium pair  ) , (
tc tc R B  maximizes its  
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welfare precisely among the pairs  ) , ( R B  that satisfy such a condition when the interest rate  
t r  
is charged. 
Consider now a deviation in which  ) , , (
t s r R B V > ) , , (
s s s s r R B V . Given the out-of-
equilibrium beliefs specified above, it will be perceived as soft.  Then, it cannot obtain more than 
) , (
ts ts R B , which is the solution to the problem  
Max ) , , (
s t r R B V  
with  B r B r p Y p f
s
l ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + = + + − α  if  ) 1 /( f l r Y B + >α ,  f
s r r =  otherwise. 
Our assumption of p < p* implies that 
ts B = ) 1 /( f l r Y + α . Thus:  
ii.a)  ) , , (
t ts ts s r R B V ) , , (
s s s s r R B V ≤  because                              
) , , (
t ts ts s r R B V =) , , (
s ts ts s r R B V < ) , , (











there is sure repayment and thus  f
t s r r r = = , and the inequality follows from 
the fact that  
) , (
s s R B  is the optimal choice for the soft type when the interest rate 
s r  is applied. 
ii.b)  ) , , (
t ts ts t r R B V ≤ ) , , (
t tc tc t r R B V  since, by ii.a), the policy choice ) , (
ts ts R B is feasible in 
the problem defining  ) , (
tc tc R B .  
ii.c)  ) , , (
s ts ts t r R B V =) , , (
t ts ts t r R B V , because, again, there is sure repayment for this debt 
level: f
t s r r r = =  when  ) 1 /( f l r Y B + ≤α  
ii.d) from (ii.b) and (ii.d), it follows that  ) , , (
s ts ts t r R B V ≤ ) , , (
t tc tc t r R B V , and the deviation 
is not profitable. 
 
Result 2: If ) 2 / 1 )( 1 ( φ φ − + ≡ p p




M p < p*, the solution to the following problem 
Max ) , , (
M t r R B V  
with  B r B r p Y p f
M M
l
M ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + = + + − α  if  ) 1 /( f l r Y B + >α ;  f
M r r =  otherwise,  
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is given by 
M B  =  ) 1 /( f l r Y + α .  That is, for a low enough value of  
M p , the tough policymaker 
utility is maximized by choosing a debt level low enough to eliminate all cross-subsidization. 
ii) Suppose that there is a pooling equilibrium  ) , (
p p R B   with  ) 1 /( f l
p r Y B + >α . Notice that 
the interest rate charged in this equilibrium must be 
M r as defined above. Then,  
) , , (
M p p t r R B V < ) , , (
M M M t r R B V  by revealed preference:  ) , (
p p R B ) , (
M M R B ≠ , where 
) , (
M M R B is the optimal choice for the tough policymaker when it faces the interest rate when 
markets perceive a probability 
M p  of obtaining a high output . 
But, given the choice of  
M B  =  ) 1 /( f l r Y + α , the loan will be repaid for sure and the interest 
rate charged will be  f r  , no matter how the policymaker is perceived. We will thus have  
) , , (
M M M t r R B V = ) , , (
s M M t r R B V  
Thus, the tough policymaker will find it profitable to deviate to  ) , (
M M R B irrespective of the 
markets beliefs. So, there are no beliefs that can sustain the supposed equilibrium. 
iii) Suppose that there is a pooling equilibrium  ) , (
p p R B   with  ) 1 /( f l
p r Y B + ≤α . Now the 
soft policymaker will find it profitable to deviate. This is because 
) , , ( ) , , ( ) , , (
s s s s s p p s M p p s r R B V r R B V r R B V < = , 
where the equality comes from the fact that when the debt level  ) 1 /( f l
p r Y B + ≤α  is 
chosen, f
s M r r r = =  , and the inequality comes from  ) , (
s s R B  (which is different from 
) , (
p p R B ) being the optimal choice for the soft policymaker when facing 
s r . 
By deviating from the debt level  ) 1 /( f l
p r Y B + ≤α  to  ) , (
s s R B , the soft policymaker goes 
back to its choice of maximum debt and zero reserves while renouncing to no cross-subsidization 
at all. 
 
Result: 3 The least costly separating equilibrium, in which the soft policymaker chooses 
) , (
s s R B  and the tough policymaker chooses  ) , (
tc tc R B , satisfies the intuitive criterion of Cho 
and Kreps. There are no other separating equilibria satisfying such criterion. 
 
i) In any separating equilibrium the soft policymaker chooses  ) , (
s s R B .  
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To see why, suppose to the contrary that there is a separating equilibrium in which the soft 
policymaker chooses  ) , ( ) , (
1 1 s s s s R B R B ≠ .  By adhering to this equilibrium policy, the soft 
policymaker will be charged the interest rate
s r , since in any separating equilibrium the true type 
of each policymaker is revealed. If it instead deviates to its full information policy, it will be 
charged no more than 
s r  and obtain no less than ) , , (
s s s s r R B V . Since  ) , (
s s R B maximizes the 
soft policymaker’s welfare when facing 
s r ,   ) , , ( ) , , (
1 1 s s s s s s s s r R B V r R B V < , and it will prefer 
to defect to its full information policy. This contradicts the assumption. 
ii) Consider a separating equilibrium in which the soft policymaker chooses  ) , (
s s R B  and the 
tough policymaker chooses  ) , ( ) , (
1 1 tc tc t t R B R B ≠ . 
ii.a) Consider first the case in which  ) , , ( ) , , (
1 1 s s s s t t t s r R B V r R B V > . Then the soft 
policymaker will deviate to the policy  ) , (
1 1 t t R B . 
ii.b) Consider now the case in which  ) , , ( ) , , (
1 1 s s s s t t t s r R B V r R B V ≤ . 
Suppose now that the tough policymaker deviates to ) , (
tc tc R B . We can rule out that the 
defection was caused by the soft policymaker since  ) , (
tc tc R B  satisfies 
) , , ( ) , , (
s s s s t tc tc s r R B V r R B V ≤ by construction. But, we cannot rule out that the defection was 
caused by the tough type, since ) , , ( ) , , (
1 1 t tc tc t t t t t r R B V r R B V < . To see this, notice that 
) , (
tc tc R B maximizes the tough policymaker’s welfare when it faces the interest rate 
t r  among 
the choices  ) , ( R B  satisfying ) , , ( ) , , (
s s s s t s r R B V r R B V ≤ , a condition which we are now 
assuming ) , (
1 1 t t R B satisfies. Thus, according to the intuitive criterion, we should set to one the 
probability that the defector is the tough policymaker, which implies that the interest rate 
t r  will 
be charged and the defection will indeed take place.  
iii) Let us finally see that the least costly separating equilibrium, in which the soft 
policymaker chooses  ) , (
s s R B  and the tough policymaker chooses ) , (
tc tc R B , does survive the 
Cho-Kreps refinement.  
iii.a) Any deviation  ) , ( R B  satisfying  ) , , ( ) , , (
s s s s t s r R B V r R B V ≤ will not increase the  
welfare of any type of policymaker, no matter what the markets believe about the defector. This 
is clear in the case of the soft policymaker. To see that it does not increase the welfare of the  
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tough type, simply notice that  ) , (
tc tc R B maximizes the tough policymaker’s welfare when the 
lowest interest rate is charge among the choices satisfying precisely the 
condition ) , , ( ) , , (
s s s s t s r R B V r R B V ≤ . 
iii.b) Consider now a deviation  ) , ( R B satisfying ) , , ( ) , , (
s s s s t s r R B V r R B V > . Since there 
exists a posterior probability that makes the soft type gain by deviating to ) , ( R B , the intuitive 
criterion allows us to set at one the probability that the defector is the soft type. This guarantees 
that  the tough type will not deviate, since, when charged an interest rate 
s r , we have seen above 
that it can do no better than when choosing   ) , (
tc tc R B  and being charged the interest rate 




3. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
  Our study implies that political uncertainty is a key variable impacting the association 
between output shocks and the patterns of debt and international reserves.  Our approach can be 
extended to allow for output trends, where output shocks would have the interpretation of shocks 
to the growth rate of the economy.  In these circumstances, disappointing economic growth may 
trigger the regime switch to the separating equilibrium.  Our modeling strategy focused on 
explaining circumstances where the tough regime would distort its policies in order to separate 
itself from the soft, populist regime. Our model does not attempt to explain how tough and soft 
regimes come into office nor why their preferences may differ. Better understanding why 
populism arises in Latin America and other regions remains a challenge.
6   
 
  
                                                 
6 Interestingly, shortly after the IMF debt repayment by Brazil described by the lead citation, 
Argentina following with its own version.  While the Brazilian policy led to improvement in 
Brazil’s credit rating, the opposite applies to Argentina.  The Economist put it concisely, eluding 
to the replacement of the IMF by Chávez as the largest Argentina’s creditor.  The Economist, 
Dec 20th 2005, put it succinctly:  
“ The immediate effect (of Brazil debt repayment) was to rush Néstor Kirchner, Argentina's president, 
into an identical declaration just two days later. He said his government would repay $9.8 billion to the 
Fund, before the end of this month. In both cases, the motivations were similar. More telling was the 
difference in market reaction and policy implications…  Brazil's repayment exploits the robust balance of 
its international payments: reserves stand at some $67 billion. …Argentina's recent experience with the 
IMF has been far less happy… But the benefits to Argentina from its declaration of financial 
independence are hardly clear-cut. The government was paying an interest rate of 4.2% on its loans from 
the Fund. It will repay the central bank partly by issuing new debt, which is likely to pay a coupon rate of 
around 9%... Thanks to the strength of its recovery, Argentina can just about afford to repay the Fund. 
Since 2002, exports have increased by around 50% and the central bank's reserves almost tripled, to $27 
billion. Even so, markets reacted unfavorably, with both the peso and bond prices falling. That reaction 
probably had less to do with concerns about lower currency reserves than with the uncertainties Mr 
Kirchner has now introduced into Argentine economic policy by casting off Mr Lavagna and the IMF in 
short order… In place of the IMF, one of Argentina's largest creditors is now Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's 
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